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GOOD INTENTIONS, BAD CONSEQUENCES: HOW 
CONGRESS’S EFFORTS TO ERADICATE HIV/AIDS 
STIFLE THE SPEECH OF HUMANITARIAN 
ORGANIZATIONS 
Garima Malhotra+ 
The HIV/AIDS epidemic affects millions of lives worldwide.  In 2009, 
approximately 1.8 million people lost their lives to the disease.1  That same 
year, an estimated 2.6 million people became infected with the debilitating 
illness, which raised the total number of people living with the illness to an 
astronomical 33.3 million.2  Children carry an inordinate share of this burden; 
approximately 2.5 million children under the age of fifteen suffer from 
HIV/AIDS, and an estimated 16 million children have been orphaned by 
infected parents.3  These devastating numbers prompted the United States to 
take action.   
In his 2003 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush asked 
Congress to commit $15 billion to “turn the tide against AIDS,” and noted that 
“history [has seldom] offered a greater opportunity to do so much for so 
many.”4  Congress responded by enacting the United States Leadership 
Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act), 
which pledged billions of dollars to assist nonprofit organizations and foreign 
governments in the fight against these infectious diseases.5   This enormous 
financial commitment under the Leadership Act has tremendous power to 
generate positive global change; however, this well-meaning effort has turned 
                                                 
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; 
B.A., 2008, Cornell University.  The author would like to thank her parents, brother, and sister-in-
law for their prayer, support, and unconditional love, Professors Marshall Breger and Sarah 
Duggin for their guidance and expertise, and the staff of the Catholic University Law Review for 
their thoughtful edits.  The author is also eternally grateful to her cousins, Neal and Sonia, for 
their mentorship and love.  And, thank you, Sameer, for making every day special and for 
providing me with indispensable perspective. 
 1. Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), Global Report: UNAIDS 
Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic 2010, at 19 (2010), available at http://www.unaids.org 
/globalreport/documents/20101123_GlobalReport_em.pdf. 
 2. Id. at 21 tbl.2.2, 23. 
 3. Id. at 23, 24 fig.2.5, 112. 
 4. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 
82, 85 (Jan. 28, 2003). 
 5. Pub. L. No. 108-25, 117 Stat. 711 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7601 (2006 & Supp. IV 
2010)).  In 2008, the Act’s funding was extended by $48 billion to be distributed over a five-year 
period.  The Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-293, § 401(a), 122 Stat. 
2918, 2966. 
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into a constitutional battleground.6  Nonprofit organizations tasked with 
conducting HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programs around the world 
have filed suit, arguing that the Leadership Act’s funding provision violates 
their First Amendment right to free speech.7   
The funding provision only permits disbursement of federal funds to 
organizations that have “a policy explicitly opposing prostitution.”8  Congress 
included this provision pursuant to its conditional spending power, which gives 
Congress the authority to condition receipt of federal grants.9  However, the 
extent to which Congress can require federal grant recipients to surrender 
otherwise guaranteed constitutional rights is unclear.10  The uncertain scope of 
Congress’s spending power has generated the Leadership Act controversy. 
The Leadership Act promotes HIV/AIDS prevention and preventative 
intervention education, treatment, and procurement and distribution of 
HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals.11  Although a national policy against prostitution 
is critically important, tying HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention funds to the 
promotion of this policy violates the First Amendment and severely 
undermines global health efforts.12  Courts disagree on the constitutionality of 
the funding provision, section 7631(f), also known as the Policy 
                                                 
 6. See infra Part I.C. 
 7. See, e.g., Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l v. U.S. Agency of Int’l Dev. (AOSI IV), 651 
F.3d 218, 223 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that the provision violates the First Amendment by 
requiring organizations to advance the government’s position), reh’g en banc denied, No. 08-
4917-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2012); DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev. (DKT II), 477 F.3d 
758, 759–61 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (rejecting the nonprofit organization’s argument that the provision 
forces it to perpetuate a disagreeable policy that alienates high-risk populations, such as sex 
workers). 
 8. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2006).  Although the provision also prohibits assistance to 
organizations that do not oppose sex trafficking explicitly, this Comment focuses only on the 
requirement that organizations explicitly oppose prostitution.  See id. 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) 
(“Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds . . . ‘to further broad policy 
objectives by . . . [requiring] compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative 
directives.’” (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (plurality opinion))). 
 10. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 205 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he extent 
to which the Government may attach an otherwise unconstitutional condition to the receipt of a 
public benefit—implicates a troubled area of our jurisprudence in which a court ought not 
entangle itself unnecessarily.”); Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the 
Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1121 (1987) (noting that the Supreme Court generally 
approaches Conditional Spending Clause cases on a narrow “case by case” basis); Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1416 (1989) (“[T]he doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions is riven with inconsistencies.”). 
 11. Pub. L. No. 108-25, § 301(a)(2), 117 Stat. 711, 728 (2003) (codified at 22 U.S.C.  
§ 2151b-2). 
 12. See infra Part II (analyzing First Amendment concerns with the anti-prostitution policy 
requirement); infra Part III (discussing U.S. policy concerns). 
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Requirement.13  The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
upheld the provision in 2007.14  The Second Circuit recently disagreed, and 
held that the provision unconstitutionally conditioned receipt of federal grant 
money by compelling recipient organizations to oppose prostitution, thereby 
violating the First Amendment.15  
This Comment explores the constitutionality of section 7631(f) of the 
Leadership Act.  Part I examines foundational Supreme Court jurisprudence 
delineating Congress’s authority to restrict or compel speech as a condition of 
government spending.  Next, this Comment turns to the current split between 
the Second and D.C. Circuits, highlighting substantive differences in the two 
opinions.  Then, through an analysis of current Spending Clause jurisprudence, 
Part II argues that the Second Circuit correctly determined that the Policy 
Requirement violates the First Amendment and is an unconstitutional condition 
placed on federal grant money.  Finally, this Comment explores various 
alternatives that would allow Congress to advance its policy objectives without 
violating the First Amendment and the Spending Clause.  This Comment 
ultimately concludes that the best solution would restrict organizations from 
spending federal funds on activities related to legalizing prostitution, but 
permit organizations to regulate the process through which they allocate their 
money.  
I.  UNCONSTITUTIONAL-CONDITIONS JURISPRUDENCE 
A.  The Spending Clause and the Birth of the Unconstitutional-Conditions 
Doctrine 
The Spending Clause grants Congress “[p]ower [t]o lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”16  Congress may use its 
Spending Clause power broadly to benefit the “general welfare.”17  However, 
                                                 
 13. Compare DKT II, 477 F.3d 758, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2007), with AOSI IV, 651 F.3d 218, 223 
(2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, No. 08-4917-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2012). 
 14. DKT II, 477 F.3d at 764. 
 15. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 223–24. 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 17. Id.; United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).  Justice Owen Roberts, writing for 
the Court in United States v. Butler, endorsed the broad Hamiltonian view that the Spending 
Clause gives Congress “a substantive power to tax and to appropriate, limited only by the 
requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare of the United States.”  
Butler, 297 U.S. at 65–66.  Although Justice Roberts seemingly endorsed the Hamiltonian theory, 
his holding arguably applied a much narrower version of the Spending Clause.  ALPHEUS 
THOMAS MASON & DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS AND SELECTED CASES 281 (16th ed. 2012). 
  Two years after Butler, the Court endorsed a the generous definition of the “general 
welfare,” holding that Congress has discretion to determine whether spending advances the 
general welfare.  See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937); see also MASON & 
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problems may arise when Congress “attach[es] strings to its expenditures” by 
compelling recipients to engage in specific conduct in order to receive 
government funding.18  When the government compels federal subsidy or grant 
recipients to act in a manner that invokes certain constitutional rights, the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is implicated.19  Under the doctrine, if 
the government chooses to grant a benefit, it may not do so in a manner that 
requires recipients to surrender certain constitutional protections.20  In an early 
case, Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, the Supreme Court 
articulated this proposition and expressed grave concern that such conditions 
would allow the government to eviscerate the rights and guarantees embodied 
in the Constitution. 21  
                                                                                                                 
STEPHENSON, supra, at 281.  Some scholars argue that Congress’s broad authority under the 
Spending Clause is unfounded.  See John C. Eastman, Restoring the “General” to the General 
Welfare Clause, 4 CHAPMAN L. REV. 63 (2001) (arguing that “general welfare” is meant as a 
limitation to congressional spending); Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the 
Public Trust: An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 55 (2003) (“[T]he 
General Welfare Clause was an unqualified denial of spending authority.  It did not add to federal 
powers; it subtracted from them.”). 
  Congress’s spending power, however, does have some limitations. See South Dakota v. 
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987) (“[O]ther constitutional provisions may provide an independent 
bar to the conditional grant of federal funds.”). For example, federal spending affecting religious 
organizations may violate the Establishment Clause.  See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, The Role of 
the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1839 & 
n.121 (2004) (discussing Establishment Clause-based challenges to the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act, which Congress enacted to prevent religious discrimination by 
effectively “limiting religious congregations’ ability to build or expand places of worship”). 
 18. Rosenthal, supra note 10, at 1104 (explaining that an “[i]f you don’t like the conditions, 
don’t take the money,” argument must fail, given public and private entities’ dependence on 
federal grants). 
 19. Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the 
Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1988) (“The problem of unconstitutional conditions 
arises whenever a government seeks to achieve its desired result by obtaining bargained-for 
consent of the party whose conduct is to be restricted.”); Sullivan, supra note 10, at 1421–22 
(describing two prerequisites necessary to invoke the unconstitutional conditions doctrine: “the 
conditioned government benefit on the one hand and the affected constitutional right on the other 
hand”). 
 20. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (“[T]his Court has made clear that even 
though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the 
government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon 
which the government may not rely.”); Epstein, supra note 19, at 6–7 (“[E]ven if a state has 
absolute discretion to grant or deny a privilege or benefit, it cannot grant the privilege subject to 
conditions that improperly ‘coerce,’ ‘pressure,’ or ‘induce’ the waiver of constitutional rights.”). 
 21. 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926); see also Perry, 408 U.S. at 597 (“For if the government could 
deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his 
exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the 
government to ‘produce a result which [it] could not command directly.’” (quoting Speiser v. 
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958))). 
2012] Good Intentions, Bad Consequences 843 
B.  Inconsistent First Amendment Protections Under the Unconstitutional-
Conditions Doctrine 
More than a half-century of Supreme Court jurisprudence demonstrates the 
Court’s willingness to insulate First Amendment speech rights from 
encroachment under the auspices of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.22  
In the last few decades, however, the Supreme Court has applied the doctrine 
to First Amendment cases in a piecemeal fashion, creating inconsistencies and 
numerous exceptions.23  This has made it increasingly challenging for lower 
courts to apply existing precedent when determining whether government 
conditions impinge on First Amendments rights.  
1.  Denial-of-Subsidies Cases 
In some cases, the Supreme Court has upheld conditional grants as 
constitutional even when they compel grant recipients to forgo their First 
Amendment rights.  In these cases, however, the grant conditions merely 
denied a subsidy and did not impose an impermissible condition or penalty.24  
In Regan v. Taxation with Representation, the Court declined to apply strict 
scrutiny and upheld the denial of tax benefits to not-for-profit organizations.25  
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) denied § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status to 
Taxation with Representation of Washington (TWR) because a large majority 
                                                 
 22. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977) (holding that states may not require 
motorists to display an ideological message on their license plates); Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518 
(explaining that states may not deny tax exemptions to veterans who refuse to submit to an oath 
disproving of forcible government overthrow); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
642 (1943) (holding that states cannot compel public school children to recite the pledge of 
allegiance).  The government may, however, use stipulations that arguably infringe on other 
constitutionally protected rights.  See Burgess v. Lowery, 201 F.3d 942, 947 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(explaining that the government may lawfully require airline passengers to undergo reasonable 
security screening that might otherwise implicate their Fourth Amendment right against 
unreasonable search and seizures). 
 23. See supra note 10. 
 24. See Sullivan, supra note 10, at 1439 (noting the “penalty/nonsubsidy distinction” and 
explaining that “‘[p]enalties’ coerce; ‘nonsubsidies’ do not”). 
 25. 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983) (holding that Congress is not required to fund TWR’s 
lobbying).  Although Taxation with Representation focuses on tax benefits rather than conditional 
grants, the Court clearly applies a general Spending Clause analysis.  See id. at 540; see also 
Rosenthal, supra note 10, at 1123 (“The Court has also occasionally appeared to treat tax benefits 
as constitutionally equivalent to spending.” (footnote omitted)). 
  The Court’s refusal to apply a strict-scrutiny analysis reflects its view that the 
government is not required to subsidize the exercise of First Amendment rights.  Taxation with 
Representation, 461 U.S. at 549 (“[A] legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a 
fundamental right does not infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny.”); ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 982 (4th ed. 2011).  But see 
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 195 n.4  (1991) (applying strict scrutiny to find that the Title X 
provision at issue was narrowly tailored). 
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of its activities involved lobbying, which is not permitted under the section.26  
TWR argued that Congress’s decision to deny tax-exempt status because of its 
lobbying activities violated its First Amendment right to free speech.27  The 
Court disagreed with TWR, and held that Congress can choose what conduct to 
fund.28  In a concurring opinion, Justice Harry Blackmun conceded that 
lobbying restrictions placed on § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status violated TWR’s 
freedom of speech, but that any “constitutional defect” was remedied by 
another statutory provision that allowed the organization to both receive a tax 
exemption and lobby through an affiliate organization.29   
The Supreme Court similarly declined to strike down a regulation 
prohibiting federal funding recipients from providing certain family planning 
methods in the influential case Rust v. Sullivan.30  The challenged regulation, 
section 1008 of the Public Health Services Act, states that “[n]one of the funds 
appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion is 
a method of family planning.”31  The regulations promulgated to implement 
section 1008 prohibit Title X projects from participating in acts that 
“encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a method of family  
planning”—including providing referrals to abortion providers.32  The 
regulations also require Title X projects to maintain financial and physical 
independence from abortion-related services.33   
                                                 
 26. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 543–44 (noting that although TWR had a  
§ 501(c)(4) entity through which it could lobby, it brought suit to use tax-deductible funds, which 
it received only through its § 501(c)(3) entity); see also 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
 27. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 545.  TWR analogized its case to Speiser v. 
Randall, in which the Court held unconstitutional a state law requiring parties seeking a  
property-tax exemption to advocate against the forcible overthrow of the government.  Id.; 
Speiser, 357 U.S. at 517–19.  The Court rejected the analogy and noted that, unlike the state law 
in Speiser, § 501(c)(3) does not deny TWR a right or benefit; rather, it prevents Congress from 
allocating public funds to lobbying.  Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 545. 
 28. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 546 (“Congress has not infringed any First 
Amendment rights or regulated any First Amendment activity.  Congress has simply chosen not 
to pay for TWR’s lobbying.”). 
 29. Id. at 552–53 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  In Justice Blackmun’s view, the distinction 
between § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) allowed Congress to consciously limit tax benefits to  
non-lobbying activities only, without prohibiting organizations from lobbying with private funds.  
Id. at 553.  Justice Blackmun also warned that if Congress attempted to limit the organization’s 
control of its lobbying affiliate, “the First Amendment problems would be insurmountable.”  Id. 
 30. Rust, 500 U.S. at 196–98. 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (2006). 
 32. 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a) (1991).  Although federal funds account for approximately half of 
a Title X program’s budget, section 1008 applies to the whole program.  David Cole, Beyond 
Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 684 (1992). 
 33. 42 C.F.R. § 59.9.  Recipients of Title X funds argued that the “impermissibly 
burden[some]” regulation, mandating physical and financial separation, is inconsistent with the 
plain language of Title X.  Rust, 500 U.S. at 187–88.  The Court replied that “if one thing is clear 
from the legislation history, it is that Congress intended that Title X funds be kept separate and 
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The recipients claimed that the provision violated the First Amendment by 
regulating their speech on abortion advocacy as a condition for receiving 
government funding.34  The Court analogized the case to Taxation with 
Representation, and found that the government’s choice not to fund abortion-
related activities did not violate the First Amendment.35  In particular, the 
Court found that the regulation prohibiting counseling on abortion or referring 
to abortion providers was not impermissible viewpoint discrimination, but 
rather “a case of the Government refusing to fund activities, including speech, 
which are specifically excluded from the scope of the project funded.”36  The 
Court concluded that these provisions were not unconstitutional because they 
merely required recipients to “keep such [abortion-related] activities separate 
and distinct from Title X activities.”37  The Court reasoned that this was a 
permissible restriction based on the government’s determination of the 
statute’s purpose and what activities it chose to fund.38  Though the Rust Court 
did not explicitly characterize it as such, this doctrine later became known as 
the government speech doctrine.39 
                                                                                                                 
distinct from abortion-related activities.”  Id. at 190.  For a discussion on the effect of such 
regulations on organizations, see infra Part III.B–C. 
 34. Rust, 500 U.S. at 192 (arguing that the Act imposed “viewpoint-discriminatory 
conditions on government subsidies” by only funding programs that promoted the government’s 
agenda). 
 35. Id. at 197–98; see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479–80 (1977) (holding that the 
government may choose not to subsidize abortion with public funds).  Justice Blackmun, who 
concurred in Taxation with Representation, stated in dissent: 
Until today, the Court never has upheld viewpoint-based suppression of speech simply 
because that suppression was a condition upon the acceptance of public funds.  
Whatever may be the Government’s power to condition the receipt of its largess upon 
the relinquishment of constitutional rights, it surely does not extend to a condition that 
suppresses the recipient’s cherished freedom of speech based solely upon the content or 
viewpoint of that speech. 
Id. at 207 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518–19 (1958)); see 
also Cole, supra note 32, at 684–85 (“[I]n at least one respect [Rust] was faithful to precedent: it 
reflects all the ambivalence and confusion that has long characterized the Supreme Court’s 
adjudication . . . .”). 
 36. Rust, 500 U.S. at 194–95. 
 37. Id. at 196 (distinguishing Title X projects from grantees by explaining that “the 
Government is not denying a benefit to anyone, but is instead simply insisting that public funds 
be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized”).  In a detailed analysis of the Rust 
opinion, Associate Professor David Cole noted that Rust’s “broad dicta” suggests that a restriction 
may still be unconstitutional if it is: (1) “aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas,” (2) 
“‘singl[es] out a disfavored group,’” and (3) is “content- or viewpoint-based in forums dedicated . 
. . to expressive activities.”  Cole, supra note 32, at 693. 
 38. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. 
 39. See infra note 125. 
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2.  Unconstitutional-Conditions Cases 
In other cases, the Court has invalidated provisions that condition grant 
funding by restricting First Amendment rights.40  Reconciling these cases with 
Taxation with Representation and Rust proves difficult.  In FCC v. League of 
Women Voters of California, the Court held unconstitutional section 399 of the 
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, which prohibited noncommercial 
broadcasting stations receiving federal grant money from “editorializing.”41  
The Court found that the ban was not narrowly tailored to achieve its policy 
objective,42 and held that the blanket restriction impermissibly prevented 
broadcasting stations from editorializing—even through use of private funds.43  
Although the Court found that section 399 was an impermissible use of the 
government’s Spending Clause power, it noted that if Congress allowed 
stations to create two separate entities—one prohibited from editorializing, 
which would receive government funding, and another that could editorialize 
but would not benefit from public funds—the Act could be permissible.44 
More recently, the Supreme Court invalidated a provision that prohibited 
federally funded legal-service providers from representing clients in challenges 
to existing welfare law.45  The Court, in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 
found that this provision violated the First Amendment rights of legal-service 
funding recipients by creating a limited forum that regulated how legal-service 
providers may advocate on their client’s behalf.46  Although not explicitly 
invoking the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the Court found that the 
funding restrictions impermissibly controlled the speech of private actors47 and 
                                                 
 40. See infra notes 41–49 and accompanying text. 
 41. 468 U.S. 364, 395 (1984); see Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 
Stat. 365, 368 (1967). 
 42. Section 399 was intended to appease concerns that government funding could turn 
noncommercial broadcast stations into “propaganda organs for the government,” or lead viewers 
to believe the editorials were government opinions. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 372, 
395.  The Court held that section 399 was both under- and over-inclusive and was not sufficiently 
tailored to achieve its stated goals.  Id. at 392–94.  Justice William Rehnquist, joined by Chief 
Justice Warren Burger and Justice Byron White, dissented.  Id. at 405 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the Act was a legitimate exercise of Congress’s spending power). 
 43. Id. at 395–96, 400 (majority opinion) (noting that only one percent of the station’s 
income came from the government grant). 
 44. Id. at 400. 
 45. See generally Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).  Legal Services 
Corporation (LSC) is a D.C. nonprofit created by Congress to provide access to legal assistance 
by distributing federal funds to eligible providers.  See id. at 536.  Both LSC and the government 
found that “the restriction prevents an attorney from arguing to a court that a state statute conflicts 
with a federal statute or that either a state or federal statute by its terms or in its application is 
violative of the United States Constitution.”  Id. at 537. 
 46. Id. at 544–46.  The Court noted that controlling how an LSC attorney may advocate on 
behalf of his or her client “threatens severe impairment of the judicial function.”  Id. at 546. 
 47. Id. at 542; see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 
(1995) (“It does not follow . . . that viewpoint-based restrictions are proper when the University 
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amounted to viewpoint-based discrimination because, unlike in Rust, the 
“program was designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a 
governmental message.”48  Thus, the Court held that although Congress may 
choose not to fund all forms of legal representation, it may not “define the 
scope of the litigation it funds to exclude certain vital theories and ideas.”49   
3.  Viewpoint-Based Restrictions   
Viewpoint-based speech restrictions and their relation to the government 
speech doctrine have attracted the Court’s attention on various occasions.  In 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, the Court held 
unconstitutional a University of Virginia guideline that denied organizational 
funding to groups that expressed religious views.50  The Court noted the blurry 
distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination, but qualified the 
guidelines as viewpoint discrimination because the University disfavored 
student journalistic efforts with religious viewpoints, rather than excluding 
religion as a subject matter altogether.51  The Court distinguished this case 
from Rust, noting that although the University may regulate the content of 
speech when it enlists private actors to convey its message as in Rust, it may 
not discriminate against private entities it subsidizes because of the entity’s 
viewpoint.52  Thus, the Court found that because the purpose of the 
University’s funding regulation was not intended to convey a University 
message, the funding restriction was unconstitutional.53  
                                                                                                                 
does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to 
encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.”).  But cf. Rumsfeld v. Forum of Academic 
& Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 60 (2006) (holding that government funding restrictions 
that require universities to allow military recruiters onto their campuses was constitutional 
because the funding restriction did not discriminate based on viewpoint, as no one was required to 
endorse a “Government-mandated pledge” and everyone was still allowed to voice their 
disagreement with the government viewpoint). 
 48. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 548. 
 49. Id. at 541. 
 50. 515 U.S. 819, 836–37 (1995). 
 51. Id. at 830–31. 
 52. Id. at 832–34.  The Court has also invalidated viewpoint-based conditions when speech 
is restricted in forums that are especially designed to promote free speech.  See Keyishian v. Bd. 
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 601–03 (1967) (finding a restriction on faculty speech at a public 
university to be unconstitutional); cf. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime 
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 108, 116 (1991) (invalidating a state law requiring a criminal to remit 
money earned by publishing a book describing his crimes to the state in order to compensate 
victims).  Such viewpoint-based restrictions “raise[] the specter that the government may 
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.”  Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 
U.S. at 116 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448–49 (1991)). 
 53. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834–35. 
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C.  The Leadership Act:  Enactment, Judicial Review, and Controversy 
1.  The Purpose, History, and Original Implementation of the Leadership 
Act and its Policy Requirement 
In 2003, the 108th Congress enacted the Leadership Act to “authorize[] a 
multisectoral approach to fighting AIDS, and endorse[] education, research, 
prevention, treatment and care of those infected with HIV and those 
individuals living with AIDS.”54  This historic legislation allocated $15 billion 
to address both the humanitarian health crisis and a growing international 
security crisis55 “that demand[ed] a global humanitarian response with the 
United States in the lead.”56   
Representative Christopher Smith introduced the Policy Requirement as an 
amendment to the Leadership Act in the House Committee on International 
Relations.57  The amendment became part of the Leadership Act, and states 
that “[n]o funds made available to carry out this chapter . . . may be used to 
provide assistance to any group or organization that does not have a policy 
explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.”58  A close reading of the 
legislative history reveals that Representative Smith introduced the Policy 
Requirement with the primary purpose of eradicating human trafficking and 
prostitution.59  In his statements before the Committee, Representative Smith 
                                                 
 54. H.R. REP. NO. 108-60, at 23 (2005).  A similar version of the bill received bipartisan 
support in the 107th Congress.  Id. at 25. However, the bill was not enacted because the House 
and Senate could not reconcile the different versions of the bill despite agreement by both 
chambers on “the need for expanded assistance to fight the HIV/AIDS pandemic.”  Id. 
 55. Id. at 24 (“The HIV/AIDS pandemic is a crisis that threatens the stability, economy and 
democratic institutions of many nations.”).  The report also noted that HIV/AIDS threatens to 
undermine democracy in Africa, as military personnel in African countries have the highest risk 
of contracting HIV/AIDS.  Id. at 24–25; see also United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003: Markup Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 108th 
Cong. 77 [hereinafter Leadership Act Markup] (statement of Rep. Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, H. 
Comm. on Int’l Relations). 
 56. Leadership Act Markup, supra note 55, at 78 (statement of Rep. Tom Lantos, Member, 
H. Comm. on Int’l Relations) (“For those of us who have long called for a real commitment of 
resources to address the HIV/AIDS crisis, our day has arrived.”).  Representative Lantos also 
noted three important ways the Act tackles the HIV/AIDS problem: (1) providing funding for 
treatment and prevention, (2) allocating resources to organize an international effort, and (3) 
establishing strong leadership from government and nonprofit partners committed to “a long-term 
campaign to defeat [HIV/AIDS].”  Id. at 79. 
 57. Id. at 148 (statement of Rep. Christopher Smith, Vice Chairman, H. Comm. on Int’l 
Relations).  At the time the Smith Amendment was introduced, the Committee on International 
Relations had already approved another amendment—the Hyde Amendment—that restricted 
funds related to prostitution and human trafficking.  Id. at 96 (statement of Rep. Henry J. Hyde, 
Chairman, H. Comm. on Int’l Relations). 
 58. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2006). 
 59. Leadership Act Markup, supra note 55, at 148 (statement of Rep. Christopher Smith, 
Vice Chairman, H. Comm. on Int’l Relations).  Representative Smith further noted that funding 
an “organization that does that kind of thing” supports the oppression of sex slaves.  Id. at 149.  
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briefly expressed his view that the amendment would help curtail the increase 
of HIV/AIDS infections.60  The Committee approved the amendment by a slim 
margin, and the Policy Requirement subsequently became part of the 
Leadership Act.61    
Following the enactment of the Leadership Act, U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) began distributing grants.62  Heeding a 
Department of Justice (DOJ) warning, the agency only applied the Policy 
Requirement to foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs).63  The DOJ 
later withdrew this warning, which prompted USAID to apply the Policy 
Requirement to domestic NGOs as well.64  To implement the Act, USAID 
issued the Acquisition and Assistance Policy Directive 05-04 (AAPD 05-04) in 
June 2005.65  Among other things, AAPD 05-04 required both foreign and 
domestic NGOs to comply with a provision entitled Prohibition on the 
                                                                                                                 
To garner support for the amendment, Representative Smith highlighted many disturbing facts 
regarding the prevalence of human trafficking and prostitution around the world.  Id.  This 
suggests that Representative Smith’s main goal was to organize an effort to end prostitution and 
human trafficking, rather than address HIV/AIDS concerns. 
 60. Id. at 148–49.  But see infra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing studies 
showing that assistance to prostitutes, in all forms, helps reduce the occurrence of HIV/AIDs). 
 61. Leadership Act Markup, supra note 55, at 160 (passing with a vote of twenty-four for 
the amendment and twenty-two against); see also Pub. L. No. 108-25, 117 Stat. 711 (2003) 
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7631). 
 62. OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., AAPD 04-04, 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AGAINST HIV/AIDS, TUBERCU-LOSIS 
AND MALARIA ACT OF 2003—ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE, LIMITATION ON THE USE OF FUNDS 
AND OPPOSITION TO PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING 2–3 (2004), available at 
http://www.usaid.gov/business/business_opportunities/cib/pdf/aapd04_04_original.pdf. 
 63. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev. (AOSI I), 430 F. Supp. 
2d 222, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, No. 08-
4917-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2012).  An undisclosed memorandum written by the DOJ’s Office of 
Legal Counsel questioned the constitutionality of section 7631(f).  Laura Abel, Obama 
Administration Refuses to Release Bush-Era OLC Opinion Characterizing “Anti-Prostitution 
Policy Requirement” as Unconstitutional, HILL’S CONGRESS BLOG (Oct. 20, 2009, 8:27 AM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/healthcare/63837-obama-administration-refuses-to-release-
bush-era-olc-opinion-characterizing-anti-prostitution-policy-requriement-as-unconstitutional-.  
The memorandum served as the administration’s impetus for not applying section 7631(f) to 
domestic-based NGOs for eighteen months.  Id.  After the DOJ, the Department of Health and 
Human Services, and USAID refused Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to produce 
the memo, the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law filed a lawsuit 
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking its release.  Brennan Ctr. 
for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, No. 09 Civ. 8756 (VM), 2011 WL 
4001146, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011).  Following a FOIA analysis, the court ordered the 
agencies to release the memorandum.  Id. at *7. 
 64. AOSI I, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 234–35. 
 65. OFFICE OF ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE,U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., AAPD 05-04, 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AGAINST HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS 
AND MALARIA ACT OF 2003—ELIGIBILITY LIMITATION ON THE USE OF FUNDS AND OPPOSITION 
TO PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING 1–2 (2005) [hereinafter AAPD 05-04], available at 
http://www.usaid.gov/business/business_opportunities/cib/pdf/aapd04_04_original.pdf. 
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Promotion or Advocacy of the Legalization or Practice of Prostitution or Sex 
Trafficking.  The provision required recipients to certify their compliance with 
the U.S. government’s policy against prostitution and trafficking.66  
2.  Questioning the Policy Requirement Through Judicial Review 
Following the enactment of the Leadership Act, nonprofit agencies began to 
question the constitutionality of the Policy Requirement.67  Various NGOs 
brought suit in the U.S. District Courts for the District of Columbia and the 
Southern District of New York.68  On appeal, the  D.C. Circuit and the Second 
Circuit reached different conclusions.69  Their divergent opinions reflect the 
tension that permeates the existing precedent on unconstitutional conditions.  
a.  The D.C. Circuit Upholds the Policy Requirement 
i.  The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia Finds Section 
7631(f) Unconstitutional  
DKT International is a nonprofit family planning organization that conducts 
HIV/AIDS prevention work in over a dozen countries.70  As part of this effort, 
DKT distributes condoms in Vietnam.71  DKT received USAID funding for 
such work as a sub-grantee of Family Health International (FHI).72  During the 
summer of 2005, FHI informed DKT that its sub-grantee status required DKT 
to certify that it had anti-sex trafficking and anti-prostitution policies.73  When 
                                                 
 66. Id. at 5–6.   Under AAPD 05-04, grants and agreements were required to include the 
following language: 
The U.S. Government is opposed to prostitution and related activities, which are 
inherently harmful and dehumanizing . . . . Except as noted in the second sentence of 
this paragraph, as a condition of entering into this agreement or any subagreement, a 
non-governmental organization or public international organization 
recipient/subrecipient must have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex 
trafficking. 
Id. at 5.  Before receiving USAID funds, each recipient must provide a certification as follows: 
“[Recipient’s name] certifies compliance as applicable with the standard provision[] entitled 
‘Prohibition on the Promotion or Advocacy of the Legalization or Practice of Prostitution or Sex 
Trafficking’ included in the reference agreement.”  Id. at 6. 
 67. See supra note 63. 
 68. DKT Int’l v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev. (DKT I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 5, 6–7 (D.D.C. 2006), 
rev’d, 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2007); AOSI I, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 228–30. 
 69. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 239–40  (affirming preliminary injunctions enjoining USAID from 
applying the Policy Requirement to plaintiff NGOs); DKT II, 477 F.3d 758, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(reversing the district court and holding that the Leadership Act does not compel speech in 
violation of the First Amendment). 
 70. HOME, DKT INT’L, http://www.dktinternational.org (last visited Jan. 21, 2012). 
 71. DKT I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 9. 
 72. Id.  USAID grants funded approximately sixteen percent of the nonprofit’s budget.  Id. 
 73. Id. (noting that FHI refused to remit unused grant money to DKT after their original 
grant term expired because a DKT representative refused to certify such a policy). 
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DKT refused to sign the certification agreement, FHI cancelled a grant that it 
had already agreed to fund.74  DKT explained that it refused to enact such a 
policy because it would have “stigmatizing and alienating” effects on sex 
workers, thus hampering DKT’s efforts to aid those most vulnerable to 
HIV/AIDS.75   
Following the grant cancellation, DKT promptly filed suit in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia against USAID and USAID 
Administrator, Andrew S. Natsios.76  DKT challenged the constitutionality of 
the Policy Requirement as applied to DKT and AAPD 05-04’s requirement 
that DKT have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution.77   
The district court held that Congress exceeded its Spending Clause authority 
by placing an unconstitutional condition, in the form of viewpoint-based 
restrictions,78 on the receipt of federal funds.79  Critically, the court observed 
that the regulations prohibited DKT from having a contrary policy or to even 
remain neutral to prostitution and sex trafficking.80  As the Policy Requirement 
restricted grantees rather than the grant as in Rust, the court found that it could 
not reconcile the two cases.81  
                                                 
 74. Id. (explaining that FHI agreed to remit $60,000 of USAID grant funds to DKT for a 
newly proposed condom-lubricant project, but retracted the grant after DKT refused to follow the 
Policy Requirement). 
 75. Id. at 10; see also Memorandum of Law of Aids Action and Twenty-One Other 
Organizations as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and 
Summary Judgment at 12–22, DKT I, 435 F. Supp. 2d. 5 (D.D.C. 2006) (No. 05-01604) 
(“Gaining the trust and cooperation of sex workers . . . is a crucial component of the anti-
HIV/AIDS programs that are implemented around the world by amici.”). 
 76. DKT I, 435 F. Supp. 2d. at 6–7. 
 77. Id. at 10. 
 78. Id. at 13 (“[The USAID regulations] require the grantees, such as DKT, to adopt a 
policy . . .  thus precluding grantees from maintaining silence or neutrality, or adopting a policy 
explicitly favoring the organization of prostitution.  As such, they are view-point based funding 
restrictions . . . .”). 
 79. Id. at 13, 16.  Because the guidelines resulted in viewpoint discrimination, they were 
subject to heightened scrutiny.  Id. at 13–14.  Under this stringent standard, the court held that the 
Policy Requirement was not narrowly tailored to achieve the agency’s goal of “having a firm, 
unilateral policy toward HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention.”  Id.  Viewpoint-based restrictions 
on speech have become paradigmatic cases for this unforgiving standard of review.  See, e.g., 
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991) 
(requiring the state to show that a viewpoint-discriminating regulation is narrowly tailored to 
serve the state’s compelling interest); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 
(1982) (describing the importance of First Amendment freedoms and the difficulty Congress 
faces when defending restriction of such values). 
 80. See DKT I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 16 (explaining that DKT’s use of private funds was 
restricted by the policy, which prohibited DKT from “taking any other position on the issue of 
prostitution in any other context, even with wholly private funds”). 
 81. Id. 
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ii.  The D.C. Circuit Disapproves the District Court’s Analysis and 
Upholds the Policy Requirement 
The D.C. Circuit reversed the decision less than a year later, and noted that 
the government not only may prefer certain viewpoints, but “often must” do so 
when expounding its own message.82  Drawing on the rationales of Rust and 
Valazquez, the court found that requiring organizations to explicitly oppose 
prostitution was “‘the government’s own message . . . being delivered.’”83  
Further, the court noted that the challenged provision did not compel recipients 
to advocate a certain message; rather, it chose to fund only those programs that 
shared the government’s message.84  Thus, the court held that this exercise of 
the government’s Spending Clause power did not violate the First 
Amendment.85  The court also rejected DKT’s contention that the regulations 
unconstitutionally prevented recipients from using private funds to engage in 
activity outside the program’s scope.86  As in Rust and Taxation with 
Representation, the court noted that DKT could certify the policy by creating a 
subsidiary, while remaining neutral itself.87  
b.  The Second Circuit Finds the Policy Requirement Unconstitutional 
i.  The Southern District of New York Grants a Preliminary Injunction 
to NGOs 
The Alliance for Open Society International (AOSI), Open Society Institute 
(OSI), and Pathfinder International all run programs that combat HIV/AIDS 
around the world.88  These NGOs accomplish this mission by providing 
reproductive health assistance, family planning services, and combating 
intravenous drug use.89  Most significantly, they provide education and 
assistance to groups—such as prostitutes—at high risk of contracting 
HIV/AIDS.90   
                                                 
 82. DKT II, 477 F.3d 58, 761 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (citing Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)). 
 83. Id. at 762 (quoting Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001)). 
 84. Id. at 764. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 763. 
 87. Id. at 763 & n.4 (noting that the government stated during oral argument that DKT could 
comply with the regulation by creating a subsidiary). 
 88. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d 218, 233 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, No. 08-4917-cv (2d 
Cir. Feb. 2, 2012); see also Public Health Program: HIV/AIDS, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND., 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/health/focus/hiv (last visited Jan. 13, 2012); What We Do: 
HIV/AIDS, PATHFINDER INT’L, http://www.pathfind.org/site/PageServer?pagename=WhatWeDo 
_AIDS (last visited Jan. 13, 2012). 
 89. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 224. 
 90. Id. (noting that AOSI has directed part of its efforts to high-risk groups such as young 
people, prostitutes, prisoners, and rural-urban migrant workers). 
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In 2005, USAID issued a letter to AOSI indicating that “‘advocating for the 
legalization of prostitution’ or ‘organizing or unionizing prostitutes for the 
purpose of advocating for the legalization of prostitution’” was not compliant 
with the Policy Requirement.91  AOSI and OSI filed a complaint against 
USAID, which Pathfinder quickly joined based on its forced compliance with 
the Policy Requirement.92  The plaintiffs subsequently added the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the United States Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as defendants.93  The NGOs claimed 
that the Policy Requirement “compel[led] the organization[s] to engage in 
speech against [their] own will,” and barred them from engaging in activities 
such as “a thoughtful policy debate on the appropriate legal regime for 
prostitution,” and participating in conferences designed to address sexual 
health issues.94  
In May 2006, District Judge Victor Marrero issued a preliminary injunction 
preventing the agencies from enforcing the Policy Requirement against the 
NGOs.95  Applying a heightened level of scrutiny,96 the district court found 
that the Policy Requirement was not narrowly tailored to serve the 
government’s goal because it created a “blanket ban on certain constitutionally 
protected speech.”97  The district court also found that the policy 
impermissibly restricted the NGOs from allocating private funds to support 
other viewpoints.98  Lastly, the court held that the Policy Requirement, as 
construed by the agencies, violated the First Amendment rights of AOSI and 
                                                 
 91. AOSI I, 430 F. Supp. 2d 222, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Letter from Christopher D. 
Crowley, USAID Mission Director, to Galina Karmanova, AOSI (Oct. 7, 2005)), aff’d, 657 F.3d 
218 (2d Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc denied, No. 08-4917-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2012). 
 92. Id. at 237–38. 
 93. Id. at 238. 
 94. Id. at 238–39. 
 95. Id. at 276.  The NGOs also challenged the Agencies’ interpretation of the Policy 
requirement, which they argued went beyond the statutory text. Id. at 239–40. In particular, they 
argued that section 7631(f) only requires a general statement of declaration against prostitution, 
and does not prohibit organizations from advocating for legalizing prostitution or assisting 
organizations with such a viewpoint if no federal funds are used for such efforts.  Id. at 240.  
After a careful analysis of the purpose of the statute and the legislative history, the court rejected 
this argument. Id. at 242–46. 
 96. Id. at 267 (adopting the test articulated in Rust, which asks “whether the restriction, as 
interpreted and applied by Defendants, is ‘narrowly tailored to fit Congress’s intent’” (quoting 
Rust v. United States, 500 U.S. 173, 195 n.4 (1991))). 
 97. Id. at 270.  The agencies argued that the government has an interest in ensuring that “its 
message (that the eradication of prostitution is part of its strategy to combat HIV/AIDS) [is not] 
distorted by the activities of its private partners in this fight.”  Id. at 268 (footnote omitted).  The 
court noted that the Policy Requirement’s explicit exemption of certain NGOs raised questions 
about the agencies’ interest, but “decline[d] to dwell on this debate.”  Id. at 268–69.  Ultimately, 
the court found that, even assuming the government had a significant interest, the Policy 
Requirement as construed by the government was not narrowly tailored to fit that interest.  Id. at 
269–70. 
 98. Id. at 274. 
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Pathfinder because it “improperly compels speech by affirmatively requiring 
Plaintiffs to adopt a policy espousing the government’s preferred message.”99    
ii.  New Amendments to the AAPD Guidelines Result in Second Circuit 
Remand  
The government appealed to the Second Circuit and informed the court 
during oral arguments “that HHS and USAID were developing guidelines that 
would allow grantees to establish or work with separate affiliates that would 
not be subject to the Policy Requirement.”100  HHS published its new 
guidelines the following month.101  Although the guidelines still required 
federally funded organizations to oppose prostitution explicitly, they expressly 
permitted grantees to create a non-government-funded affiliate that would not 
be subject to the Policy Requirement.102  The guidelines detailed ways grantees 
could establish “adequate separation” from an affiliate in order to “maintain 
program integrity,” including keeping all funds “physically and financially 
separate from the affiliated organization.”103  After the new guidelines were 
                                                 
 99. Id.  The court found that OSI had not sufficiently demonstrated any likelihood that it 
would succeed on its claim because it was not subject to the Policy Requirement.  Id. at 277–78. 
 100. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d 218, 225–26 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, No. 08-4917-cv 
(2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2012). 
 101. Guidance Regarding Section 301(f) of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003, 72 Fed. Reg. 41,076 (July 26, 2007). 
 102. Id.; see also OFFICE OF ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTL’L DEV., 
AAPD 05-04 AMENDMENT 1, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AGAINST 
HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA ACT OF 2003—ELIGIBILITY LIMITATION ON THE USE 
OF FUNDS AND OPPOSITION TO PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING 3 (2007) [hereinafter 
AAPD 05-04 AMENDMENT 1], available at www.usaid.gov/business/business_opportunities 
/cib/pdf/aapd05_04_amendment.pdf (“This guidance clarifies that an independent organization 
affiliated with a recipient of Leadership Act funds need not have a policy explicitly opposing 
prostitution and sex trafficking for the recipient to maintain compliance with the policy 
requirement.”). 
 103. AAPD 05-04 AMENDMENT 1, supra note 102, at 2–4.  The guidelines provide that: 
A Recipient will be found to have objective integrity and independence from such an 
organization if: 
(1) The affiliated organization is a legally separate entity; 
(2) The affiliated organization receives no transfer of Leadership Act funds, and 
Leadership Act funds do not subsidize restricted activities; and 
(3) The Recipient is physically and financially separate from the affiliated organization. 
Mere bookkeeping separation of Leadership Act funds from other funds is not 
sufficient. 
Id. at 3–4.  The guidelines list five relevant factors to determine if “such physical and financial 
separation exists”: 
(i) The existence of separate personnel, management, and governance; 
(ii) The existence of separate accounts, accounting records, and timekeeping records; 
(iii) The degree of separation from facilities, equipment and supplies used by the 
affiliated organization to conduct restricted activities, and the extent of such restricted 
activities by the affiliate; 
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implemented, the Second Circuit summarily remanded the case to the district 
court for reconsideration in light of the new guidelines, while leaving the 
preliminary injunction intact pending review.104 
iii.  Second Review: Changed Guidelines, Same Result 
On remand, the district court stood by its first decision and extended the 
preliminary injunction to prevent the agencies from applying the Policy 
Requirement to two more plaintiffs.105 The court noted that the alternative 
provided by the new guidelines did not cure the original constitutional defect 
as the NGOs were still required to adopt the government’s views publicly to 
receive federal funding.106  The court also found that the new guidelines were 
not narrowly tailored, in part because less-restrictive means to achieve the 
government’s interests existed.107 
Nearly three years after the start of litigation, the Second Circuit considered 
the merits of the case.108  Divided two to one, the panel affirmed the district 
court’s preliminary injunction after finding that the new USAID guidelines 
were an unconstitutional condition on government funding.109  Applying 
                                                                                                                 
(iv) The extent to which signs and other forms of identification which distinguish the 
Recipient from the affiliated organization are present, and signs and materials that 
could be associated with the affiliated organization or restricted activities are absent; 
and 
(v) The extent to which USAID, the U.S. Government and the project name are 
protected from public association with the affiliated organization and its restricted 
activities in materials such as publications, conferences and press or public statements. 
Id. at 4. 
 104. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev. (AOSI II), 254 F. 
App’x 843, 846 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 105. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev. (AOSI III), 570 F. 
Supp. 2d 533, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, No. 
08-4917-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2012).  The court granted the original plaintiffs’ motion to amend the 
complaint to add InterAction, the largest humanitarian NGO alliance, and GHC, another large 
alliance of international public health organizations.  Id. at 538–45. 
 106. Id. at 545–46. 
 107. Id. at 549. 
 108. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, No. 08-4917-cv (2d Cir. 
Feb. 2, 2012). 
 109. Id. at 234–40.  On February 2, 2012, the Second Circuit denied the government’s 
petition for en banc review.  Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l 
Dev.(AOSI V), No. 08-4917-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2012).  While the appeal was pending, USAID 
and HHS again altered the guidelines to make them slightly less restrictive.  AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 
227.  The new guidelines required that a grantee “affirmatively state in the funding document that 
it is ‘opposed to the practices of prostitution and sex trafficking because of the psychological and 
physical risks they pose for women, men, and children.”  Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 89.1(b) 
(2010)); see also OFFICE OF ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., AAPD 
05-04 AMENDMENT 3, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AGAINST 
HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS, AND MALARIA ACT OF 2003, AS AMENDED—ELIGIBILITY 
LIMITATION ON THE USE OF FUNDS AND OPPOSITION TO PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING 
2 (2010) available at http://www.usaid.gov/business/business-opportunities/cib/pdf/aapd05_04_ 
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heightened scrutiny,110 the court found that the Policy Requirement was an 
impermissible viewpoint-based restriction.111  The court rejected the agencies’ 
analogy to Rust’s government speech doctrine, noting that “[d]efendants 
cannot now recast the Leadership Act’s global HIV/AIDS-prevention program 
as an anti-prostitution messaging campaign.”112  Thus, the court found that the 
Policy Requirement violated the First Amendment because it compelled 
grantees to reiterate the government’s message as if it were its own to receive 
federal funding.113   
II.  THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S APPROACH SHEDS LIGHT ON INCONSISTENT 
DOCTRINE 
The disagreement between the Second and D.C. Circuits stems from the 
unprecedented conditions articulated in the Leadership Act’s Policy 
Requirement.114  Without clear guidance on when a federal spending condition 
violates the First Amendment, courts have grappled with differentiating 
between conduct- and viewpoint-based conditions, and understanding 
government versus private speech.115  This Part argues that the Second Circuit 
correctly applied existing Supreme Court jurisprudence when making this 
determination.   
A.  The New USAID Guidelines Failed to Cure the Constitutional Defect 
When the D.C. Circuit evaluated the constitutionality of the Policy 
Requirement, the new USAID guidelines had not been implemented.116  
Nonetheless, the court likened the case to Regan v. Taxation with 
Representation and Rust v. Sullivan, and found that “[n]othing prevents DKT 
from itself remaining neutral and setting up a subsidiary organization that 
certifies it has a policy opposing prostitution.”117  In both Taxation with 
Representation and Rust, the Supreme Court found that dual organizational 
                                                                                                                 
amendment3.pdf.  The new guidelines also relaxed the separation requirement by eliminating the 
requirement that affiliates have legal and managerial separation from grantees.  Id. at 2, 7–8. 
 110. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 231 (defending a heightened-scrutiny test for the Spending Clause 
enactment by noting that “Congress’s spending power, while broad, is not unlimited”). 
 111. Id. at 234–35 (reasoning that the Policy Requirement discriminated against viewpoints 
in part because it “requires recipients to take the government’s side on a particular issue,” and that 
“silence, or neutrality, is not an option for Plaintiffs”). 
 112. Id. at 237–38. 
 113. Id. at 239. 
 114. Id. at 257 n.4 (Straub, J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority correctly noted that 
“none of the [previous] unconstitutional conditions cases even involved an affirmative speech 
condition”). 
 115. See supra note 10. 
 116. See supra note 87 and text accompanying notes 100–103. 
 117. DKT II, 477 F.3d 758, 763 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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structures avoided potential constitutional problems, because the projects—not 
the recipients—were restricted.118   
However, unlike Taxation with Representation and Rust, the Policy 
Requirement does not merely deny a subsidy, it actually coerces speech.119  In 
Taxation with Representation, creation of a § 501(c)(4) affiliate allowed the 
government to restrict § 501(c)(3) organizations from lobbying.120  In Rust, the 
possibility of separately funded programs allowed the federal government to 
prohibit Title X recipients from providing abortion services with federal 
money.121   
The availability of an affiliate organization unbound by the Policy 
Requirement, alternatively, still leaves in existence an additional imposition: 
organizations receiving federal funds must also affirmatively oppose 
prostitution.122  Creating a separate entity cannot alleviate this compulsion of 
speech.123  The organization, not the program, is still burdened by its 
requirement to serve as the government’s parrot by portraying the 
government’s opinion as its own.124 
B.  The Government Speech Doctrine 
The government speech doctrine, first used by the Supreme Court in Rust,125 
allows the federal government to restrict speech as a condition to receiving 
funds if it can show that the speech was “government speech.”126  As explained 
by the Supreme Court in Velazquez, “viewpoint-based funding decisions can 
be sustained in instances in which the government is itself the speaker, . . . or 
                                                 
 118. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 119. See AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 234. 
 120. See supra text accompanying notes 29–30. 
 121. See supra text accompanying note 37. 
 122. If Congress were to implement only section 7631, which prohibits the use of federal 
funds to promote the legalization of prostitution, the facts of this case would be comparable to 
Rust and Taxation with Representation.  See AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 237 (distinguishing Title X 
from the Policy Requirement because Title X grantees “could remain ‘silen[t] with regard to 
abortion,’ and, if asked . . . w[ere] ‘free to make clear that advice regarding abortion is simply 
beyond the scope of the program.’  Here, on the other hand, Plaintiffs . . . must represent as their 
own an opinion—that they affirmatively oppose prostitution—that they might not categorically 
hold.” (citation omitted) (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991))). 
 123. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897 (2010) (concluding that even though 
the campaign-finance laws allowed corporations to create political action committees, it did not 
remedy the First Amendment restrictions on the corporations themselves). 
 124. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 239. 
 125. Andy G. Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365, 374 (2009); see 
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 533–41 (2001) (“The Court in Rust did not place 
explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X 
amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have 
explained Rust on this understanding.”). 
 126. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 25, at 1015 (noting that the First Amendment is inapplicable 
when the speech at issue is governmental). 
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instances . . . in which the government ‘used private speakers to transmit 
specific information pertaining to its program.’”127  However, when speech is 
private in nature, even though expressed with government funds,  
viewpoint-based restrictions are presumptively unconstitutional.128  Thus, in 
order to determine whether or not the Policy Requirement fits within the 
government speech doctrine, it is imperative to determine not only whether the 
speech was private, but also whether the restriction was viewpoint- or conduct-
based. 
1.  The Policy Requirement Is a Viewpoint-Based Restriction 
The Policy Requirement clearly regulates viewpoints, rather than conduct.  
If the government intended the requirement to prohibit certain conduct, it 
would refuse to fund activities that promote legalizing prostitution.129  Instead, 
the Policy Requirement affirmatively requires grantees to say something, and 
discriminates against grantees that do not agree with the government’s 
viewpoint.130  Thus, the Policy Requirement fits squarely within the purview of 
viewpoint-based restrictions as it not only “muzzles grant recipients from 
expressing any and all forbidden arguments,” but also further forces certain 
viewpoints on them.131  
 2.  Private Speech with Government Dollars 
Given the lack of Supreme Court guidance, differentiating government 
speech from private speech has proved challenging.132  In Rust, the Court 
                                                 
 127. Velazquez, 533 U.S. at 541 (citation omitted) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors 
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)); see Olree, supra note 125, at 367–68 (noting that the 
government may convey its own viewpoint without commending an alternate viewpoint). 
 128. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (“The University does acknowledge (as it must 
in light of our precedents) that ideologically driven attempts to suppress a particular point of view 
are presumptively unconstitutional in funding, as in other contexts . . . .” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 129. See supra note 24 (discussing the difference between the denial of a subsidy and an 
impermissible condition or penalty). 
 130. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d 218, 237 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, No. 08-4917-cv (2d 
Cir. Feb. 2, 2012); DKT I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 5, 12 (D.D.C. 2006), rev’d, 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 
2007). 
 131. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corps., 164 F.3d 757, 772 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing a 
different conditional-spending statute), aff’d, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
 132. See Olree, supra note 125, at 378 (observing that, in distinguishing between private and 
government speech, the Court’s approach has not been “unified and intentional”).  Most courts 
have found that speech is either government speech or private speech, but cannot be both.  See id. 
at 379.  But see Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and 
Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 671–72 (2008) (arguing that speech need not be purely 
governmental or private). 
  In the absence of clear direction from the Supreme Court, appellate courts have crafted 
their own approaches to determine when speech is governmental.  For example, the Tenth Circuit 
has developed a four-pronged test, which the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have 
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found that the restrictions on speech—although conveyed through private 
service providers—contributed to the government’s effort to promote its stance 
on certain family planning methods, and therefore fell within the government 
speech doctrine.133  In DKT, the D.C. Circuit followed this analysis when it 
ruled that the Policy Requirement communicated the government’s message.134  
In contrast, the Second Circuit followed the Velazquez Court.135  In Velazquez, 
the Court emphasized that the attorneys received federal funding for the 
purpose of representing their indigent clients, often in proceedings against the 
government—a function that simply could not be construed as speaking for the 
government.136    
The Second Circuit asked the correct question: did Congress intend for the 
Leadership Act to inform the international community that it opposes 
prostitution?137  A review of the language and legislative history of the 
Leadership Act reveals that the answer is no.138  The Leadership Act was 
intended to fight HIV/AIDS, not serve as the government’s vehicle for 
combating prostitution around the globe.139  In fact, the Policy Requirement 
was implemented with little explanation of how it would affect the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic.140  Only one of forty-one congressional findings of the Leadership 
Act discussed eradicating prostitution,141 underscoring the fact that this was not 
the central component of the Act.142  As the Second Circuit further noted, if the 
government’s goal was ending prostitution, then the government would have 
placed a blanket restriction on funding the World Health Organization (WHO), 
                                                                                                                 
since adopted, to determine whether something is government or private speech: “(1) whether the 
central purpose of the governmental program facilitating the message is to promote private views; 
(2) who exercises editorial control over the content of the message; (3) who is the literal speaker 
of the message; and (4) who bears ultimate responsibility for the content of the message.”  Olree, 
supra note 125, at 386–95 (citing Wells v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th 
Cir. 2001)). 
 133. Rust v. Sullivan, 531 U.S. 173, 178–79 (1991) (discussing the legislative history of Title 
X); see Olree, supra note 125, at 375 (“The ‘family planning without abortion’ message was the 
government’s own message, crafted in advance by the government, and the funds at issue were 
part of a program designed to promote that kind of family planning rather than speech in general.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 134. DKT II, 477 F.3d at 761. 
 135. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 237–38. 
 136. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542–43. 
 137. See Olree, supra note 125, at 411 (positing that, for the speech to qualify as 
governmental, the question, “did the government independently generate the idea of reaching an 
audience with this particular message in this medium?” must be answered in the affirmative); see 
also Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–61 (2005) (qualifying congressionally 
mandated advertisements promoting beef as government speech, even though the speakers were 
private entities). 
 138. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 139. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
 140. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 141. See 22 U.S.C. § 7601(23) (2006). 
 142. See supra Part I.C.1. 
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which has a policy advocating decreasing legal penalties for prostitutes as a 
means of fighting HIV/AIDS.143  Instead, the Policy Requirement actually 
exempts the WHO from the establishing a policy opposing prostitution.144  
Opposition to the legalization of prostitution as a part of HIV/AIDS 
treatment is not typical government speech because when the government 
endorses a set message, that message usually plays a central part in, and 
directly furthers the goals of its campaign or program.145  Instead, as the 
legislative history reveals, the addition of the Policy Requirement was ancillary 
to Congress’s goal to provide funding for HIV/AIDS efforts.146  As the Second 
Circuit aptly noted, “[i]f the government-speech principle allowed Congress to 
compel funding recipients to affirmatively espouse its viewpoint on every 
subsidiary issue subsumed within a federal spending program, the exception 
would swallow the rule.”147   
III.  THE ONLY AVAILABLE COMPROMISE: A CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION 
THAT WOULD SATISFY ALL 
The U.S. Government and the NGOs battling the global HIV/AIDS 
epidemic share the same goal: to eradicate HIV/AIDS through prevention and 
treatment methods that also address the underlying causes of the illness.148  
However, section 7631(f), as the government currently interprets it, 
unconstitutionally hampers these efforts.149  The statute stifles NGOs’ speech 
at great costs to certain HIV/AIDS victims, as “[g]aining the trust and 
cooperation of sex workers is a crucial component of the anti-HIV/AIDS 
programs,” and the Policy Requirement “threatens to alienate the communities 
with which they work.”150  Similarly, as AOSI plaintiffs stated, requiring 
NGOs to explicitly oppose prostitution negatively affects their “credibility and 
integrity as NGOs, which generally avoid taking controversial policy positions 
likely to offend host nations [and] partner organizations.”151  These concerns 
                                                 
 143. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d 218, 238 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, No. 08-4917-cv (2d 
Cir. Feb. 2, 2012). 
 144. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f). 
 145. See Olree, supra note 125, at 413. 
 146. See Leadership Act Markup, supra note 55, at 149 (statement of Rep. Christopher 
Smith, Vice Chairmain, H. Comm. on Int’l Relations). 
 147. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 238 (emphasis added). 
 148. See DKT II, 477 F.3d 758, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (describing DKT’s efforts in HIV/AIDS 
relief); supra note 56. 
 149. See supra Part II.A–B. 
 150. Amicus Brief on the Behalf of Aids Action and Twenty-Five Other Public Health 
Organizations and Public Health Experts in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 8–9, AOSI II, 254 
F. App’x 843 (2d Cir. 2007( (No. 06-4035-cv). 
 151. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 236 (quoting Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 11–12, AOSI IV, 651 
F.3d 218 (No. 08-4917-cv)).  The assertion that the Policy Requirement would “offend host 
nations” is an interesting concept with which to grapple, considering that the Policy Requirement 
is not clear about the role NGOs may play in nations that legalize prostitution. 
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have been realized in actuality.  For example, Brazil, a country that has 
involved the sex-worker population in its anti-AIDS initiative, chose not to 
receive U.S. assistance for its AIDS efforts.152  Pedro Chequer, Brazil’s 
national AIDS commissioner, explained that that they “could not conduct 
effective outreach to and programs with sex workers if [their] NGO partners 
were forced to state their explicit opposition to prostitution, as USAID was 
requiring.”153  
At minimum, Congress must amend section 7631(f) to pass constitutional 
muster.  This Part explores three alternative solutions that could survive 
constitutional scrutiny while striking a balance between the goals of Congress 
and nonprofit organizations, and discusses why only one of the solutions is 
correct as a matter of policy.154 
A.  The Government’s Message Comes From Its Own Voice, but From 
Another’s Mouth 
One possible approach, and the most restrictive option, would allow the 
federal government to continue restricting organizations’ speech, but would 
alter the content of that speech.  Under such a regulation, organizations would 
be required to explicitly state that “the United States government opposes 
prostitution,” but would not require grantees to declare that they themselves 
oppose it.  This solution would allow Congress to ensure that its  
anti-prostitution message was not “garbled” or “distorted,”155 but also ensure 
                                                 
 152. Amicus Brief on Behalf of AIDS Action and Twenty-Five Other Public Health 
Organizations, supra note 150, at 10-11. 
 153. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); Esther Kaplan, Just Say Não, NATION, May 12, 
2005, http://www.thenation.com/article/just-say-não. 
 154. Although the alternatives suggested address actions that Congress must take, it might 
also be possible for USAID, under the Chevron doctrine, to change their regulations in a manner 
that conforms to the Constitution and meets policy objectives.  See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) (stating that Congress gives 
agencies the responsibility to promulgate regulations based on reasonable interpretations of 
authorizing statutes).  Chevron presents the administrative-law dilemma that occurs when various 
administrations interpret statutes differently.  See PETER L. STRAUSS, ET. AL., GELLHORN AND 
BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 1046, 1048–49 (10th ed. 2003).  A 
fascinating case study of such administrative-law issues can be found in the promulgation of Title 
X.  See id. at 1046–48.  For example, in 1993, after President William Clinton took office, his 
administration changed the HHS regulations that implemented Title X.  Id. at 1048.  Under the 
new regulations, “Title X projects would be required, in the event of an unplanned pregnancy and 
where the patient request such action, to provide nondirective counseling to the patient on options 
relating to her pregnancy, including abortion . . . .”  Standards of Compliance for Abortion-
Related Services in Family Planning Service Projects, 58 Fed. Reg. 7462, 7462 (Feb. 5, 1993). 
 155. AOSI IV, 651 F.3d at 237 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 
515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)). 
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that NGOs would not be compelled to become the “de facto mouthpieces”156 
for the government’s opinion.  
This solution would help ensure that partners and organizations of NGOs are 
aware that the message about prostitution is not their own.  However, it is 
unclear whether requiring such a message would be constitutional.157  Further, 
this solution would leave the concerns of many NGOs unaddressed.  Vocal 
disapproval of prostitution can ostracize the sex-worker population,158 and 
force humanitarian organizations to agree that prostitution and human 
trafficking are morally wrong and despicable practices that violate human 
rights—a sentiment they may share, but have purposefully chosen not to state 
publicly.159  It is common belief among the human-rights community that 
“empowerment, organization, and unionization of sex workers can be an 
effective HIV prevention strategy and can reduce the other harms associated 
with sex work, including violence, police harassment, un-wanted pregnancy, 
and the number of underage sex workers.”160  Continuing to vocalize public 
                                                 
 156. AOSI I, 430 F. Supp. 2d 222, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011), 
reh’g en banc denied, No. 08-4917-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2012). 
 157. See Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 779 F. Supp. 2d 456, 459, 471 (D. Md. 2011) 
(noting that a resolution requiring limited pregnancy centers—those that provide information to 
pregnant women but have no physicians on staff—to post a waiting-room sign that states, among 
other things, “the Montgomery County Health Officer encourages women who are or may be 
pregnant to consult with a licensed health care provider” was unlikely to withstand scrutiny); see 
also Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 801 F. Supp. 2d 197, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(finding a likelihood of success on claims against a substantially identical provision aimed at 
pregnancy centers). 
 158. Aziza Ahmed, Feminism, Power, and Sex Work in the Context of HIV/AIDS: 
Consequences for Women’s Health, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 225, 235 (2011) (noting that 
“coercive public measures” have “pushed sex workers underground” (footnote omitted)).  See 
generally Amicus Brief on Behalf of AIDS Action and Twenty-Five Other Public Health 
Organizations, supra note 150 (discussing evidence of horrifying violence toward sex-workers by 
law enforcement in developing countries and explaining how it affects access to HIV-related 
services for sex-worker communities) . 
 159. See Nicole Franck Masenior & Chris Beyrer, The US Anti-Prostitution Pledge: First 
Amendment Challenges and Public Health Priorities, 4 PLoS Med. 1158, 1159 (2007) (noting 
that child prostitution and sex trafficking are universally opposed but that some entities may 
differentiate between sex trafficking and sex work, and seek to empower rather than shame sex 
workers). 
 160. Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Alan Berkman et al., A Critical Analysis of the 
Brazilian Response to HIV/AIDS: Lessons Learned for Controlling and Mitigating the Epidemic 
in Developing Countries, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1162, 1168 (2005) (providing a case study of 
Brazil’s successful efforts to reduce HIV/AIDS and noting that Brazil successfully sustained “a 
consistent commitment to strengthen[] previously marginalized communities,” including the sex-
worker population); LORI BOLLINGER & JOHN STOVER, THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF HIV/AIDS 
INTERVENTIONS ON THE HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AFRICA: A SIMULATION EXERCISE FOR THE 
WORLD BANK 21–22 (Mar. 3, 2007), available at http://sitesources.worldbank.org/INTHIV 
AIDS/Resources/375798-1103037153392/ThePotentialImpactofHIV3March2007.pdf (noting that 
“interventions targeting [sex workers] across all of sub-Saharan Africa are very cost-effective” 
and have been shown to avert the number of infections). 
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opposition to the activities of sex-workers, albeit on behalf of the government, 
would still brand sex workers and lessen the effects of meaningful 
humanitarian efforts.161   
Additionally, to successfully carry out their humanitarian efforts, NGOs 
must remain impartial and far removed from government ideology and 
politics.162  Requiring NGOs to share the government’s message gives the 
impression that the organizations are government agents.163  Because much of 
the sex-worker population experiences violence from state actors, which may 
cause them to distruct government, this solution would negatively affect NGOs 
that wanted to work with and in the sex-worker community.164 
B.  Follow Rust Verbatim: Restrict Activities, Not Speech 
Conversely, Congress could follow Rust and amend the statute by removing 
the coerced-speech requirement altogether.  This would convert the 
impermissible viewpoint-based restriction to a permissible conduct-based 
restriction, under which Congress chooses to fund only certain activities.165  
Under this scenario, Congress would discard section 7631(f) in its entirety and 
rely primarily on section 7631(e), which provides that, “[n]o funds made 
available to carry out this chapter . . . may be used to promote or advocate the 
legalization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking.”166  This approach 
would be constitutional, as it is well established that the government may 
                                                 
 161. As Ban Ki-moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, poignantly stated, stopping 
discrimination against vulnerable groups such as sex workers would lead to “fewer infections, 
less demand for antiretroviral treatment, and fewer deaths. Not only is it unethical not to protect 
these groups: it makes no sense from a public health perspective.  It hurts all of us.”  Ban Ki-
moon, Sec’y Gen. of the United Nations, Address to the International AIDS Conference (Aug. 3, 
2008), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statements 
_fall.asp?statID=297. 
 162. LARRY MINEAR, THE HUMANITARIAN ENTERPRISE: DILEMMAS AND DISCOVERIES  
76–80 (2002) (“[T]he proposition that relief and rights groups should embrace political agendas 
seems dangerous and diversionary.”).  Many organizations find insulation from politics essential 
in their efforts, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, which remains neutral on 
political issues so as to focus on “matters of ‘charity’ rather than of ‘justice.’”  Id. at 78. 
  The policy shift of the Bush administration’s HIV prevention efforts led to the “outright 
disapproval” of many public-health professionals.  J. Blake Scott, The Rhetoric of Science Versus 
Politics in U.S. HIV Testing and Prevention Policy, in COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVES ON 
HIV/AIDS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 297, 309 (Timothy Edgar et al. eds., 2008).  In 2003, Joe 
McIlhany, president of a medical institute receiving federal funds and appointee to the CDC 
director’s Advisory Committee, published an article titled AIDS a Disease, Not a Political Issue, 
in which he criticized the use of politics in guiding public-health efforts.  See id. at 309–10 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 163. See MINEAR, supra note 162, at 115. 
 164. See Ahmed, supra note 158, at 252–56. 
 165. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 166. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(e) (2006). 
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choose which activities to fund.167  It would also promote congressional efforts 
to reduce prostitution, while recognizing the importance of neutrality by 
international public-health organizations on policy matters.  
If Congress were to amend the statute in this manner, USAID could require 
regulated organizations to create two separate entities to manage their funds, as 
HHS did in Rust.168  Although this approach would be constitutional, it would 
still have devastating effects on public-health organizations by adding 
enormous administrative costs to their already low budgets.169     
C.  Allow Organizations to Determine the Best Manner to Use and Regulate 
Their Funds 
As a matter of law and policy, the most reasonable alternative to the current 
Policy Requirement is to continue to honor the government’s policy of denying 
funds to efforts that promote or advocate the legalization of prostitution, but do 
so in a manner that respects humanitarian organizations’ legitimate wish to 
refrain from taking a political stance on an issue that affects a population they 
serve.  Although the Supreme Court in Rust held that agency regulations 
requiring financial and physical separation are valid, such restrictions in the 
context of public-health organizations are a budgetary nightmare.170  Thus, 
Congress’s best alternative is to take this option one step further: eliminate the 
physical separation requirement for funds.171 
Under this approach, NGOs would still be required to use government funds 
to finance only the conduct for which the funds were granted; however, 
organizations would have the ability to create a structure through which they 
                                                 
 167. See supra Part I.B.1–2.  But see Sung Chang, Prostitutes + Condoms = AIDS?: The 
Leadership Act, USAID, and the HHS Guidelines’ Failure to Define “Promoting Prostitution”, 19 
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 373, 385 (2011) (discussing how the definition of 
“promoting” is ambiguous and unconstitutionally vague). 
 168. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991). 
 169. See Andrew Haber, Note, Rethinking the Legal Services Corporation’s Program 
Integrity Rules, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 404, 436 (2010) (discussing how the LSC rules 
requiring grantee organizations to create an affiliate for its non-federally funded activities 
challenges the work of nonprofits “as resources remain scarce”); see also David S. Udell, 
Implications of the Legal Services Struggle for Other Government Grants for Lawyering for the 
Poor, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 895, 919 (1998) (noting that requiring separate funds for LSC-
funded organizations was so burdensome and unmanageable that only one such organization had 
created an affiliate for that purpose by 1998). 
 170. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 196.  It is clear that all government programs increase 
management and bureuacratization of the public sector.  LESTER M. SALAMON, PARTNERS IN 
PUBLIC SERVICE: GOVERNMENT-NONPROFIT RELATIONS IN THE MODERN WELFARE STATE 107 
(1995) (“Government programs therefore often involve more red tape, cumbersome applications 
requirements, and regulatory control than is common with other forms of financial support.”).  
What is troublesome about requiring recipients to keep their federal funds “physically and 
financially separate” from their private funds, is that it only further increases the bureaucratic 
burden for the public sector.  See 42 C.F.R. § 54.9 (2010). 
 171. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
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could regulate their own funds.  As a result, the heavy burden created by 
requiring organizations to form two separate entities to manage their finances 
would dissipate.   The government would be satisfied knowing that its funds 
were being used for permitted conduct only, and organizations would rejoice in 
having the ability to dictate the management of their own budgets. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The fractured Spending Clause jurisprudence provides little assistance to 
courts in determining whether a government condition on the receipt of federal 
funds is unconstitutional.  The  dissonant conclusions of the courts in DKT 
International v. United States Agency for International Development and 
Alliance for Open Society International v. United States Agency for 
International Development highlight the inadequacies of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area.  Both courts arrived at different conclusions on a 
seemingly similar question: whether the Policy Requirement of the Leadership 
Act, which requires organizations to explicitly oppose prostitution to receive 
federal funds for HIV/AIDS programs, impermissibly violates the First 
Amendment, and thus, qualifies as an unconstitutional condition.  The D.C. 
Circuit found that the Policy Requirement was not an unconstitutional 
condition.  The Second Circuit disagreed.  A careful examination of the 
legislative history of the Leadership Act demonstrates the strengths of the 
Second Circuit’s holding.  As the Supreme Court considers whether or not to 
accept the case, it would be well advised to uphold the Second Circuit’s panel 
decision.  The best fix, however, would be a legislative one—satisfying both 
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